2025-12-02 · Authensor

SafeClaw vs Cloud IAM (AWS/GCP/Azure) for Agent Workloads

Cloud IAM systems — AWS IAM, GCP IAM, Azure RBAC — are powerful authorization frameworks for managing access to cloud resources. They control who can call which cloud APIs: creating S3 buckets, spinning up VMs, reading from databases. But AI agents do not only interact with cloud APIs. They write local files, execute shell commands, read sensitive configuration, and make arbitrary network requests. Cloud IAM has zero visibility into these local operations. This comparison examines the gap and how SafeClaw fills it.

What Cloud IAM Controls

Cloud IAM governs access to cloud provider APIs. AWS IAM policies determine which principals can call which API actions on which resources. GCP IAM binds roles to members for GCP services. Azure RBAC assigns roles scoped to subscriptions, resource groups, or individual resources.

All three operate at the cloud API level. They answer: "Can this service account call s3:PutObject on this bucket?" They do not answer: "Should this AI agent be allowed to write to /etc/config.yaml on the local machine?"

What SafeClaw Controls

SafeClaw by Authensor operates at the local action level. It gates file_write, file_read, shell_exec, and network actions that AI agents attempt on the machines where they run. It evaluates every action against a policy engine before execution, with sub-millisecond latency and deny-by-default architecture.

Feature Comparison Table

| Feature | SafeClaw | Cloud IAM (AWS/GCP/Azure) |
|---|---|---|
| Scope | Local machine actions (files, commands, network requests) | Cloud provider API calls |
| Action types controlled | file_write, file_read, shell_exec, network | Cloud service API actions (e.g., s3:PutObject, compute.instances.create) |
| Agent awareness | First-class — policies scoped per AI agent | Limited — service accounts or assumed roles, no agent-level granularity |
| Local file protection | Yes — per-path, per-operation gating | No — zero visibility into local filesystem operations |
| Local command gating | Yes — per-command evaluation with parameter inspection | No — cannot control local shell commands |
| Network request control | Per-request policy (domain, endpoint, method) | VPC/Security Group level (IP/port), not request-level |
| Human-in-the-loop | Built-in action approval workflow | Not native — requires external workflow (Step Functions, etc.) |
| Audit trail | Tamper-proof SHA-256 hash chain per action decision | CloudTrail / Audit Logs — comprehensive for cloud API calls |
| Deny-by-default | Yes — all local actions denied unless explicitly allowed | Implicit deny for IAM; explicit allows required |
| Pre-execution evaluation | Yes — every action evaluated before execution | Yes — API calls authorized before execution |
| Setup | npx @authensor/safeclaw — one command, runs locally | Console/CLI/IaC — tied to cloud provider account |
| Dependencies | Zero third-party dependencies, TypeScript strict | Cloud provider SDK, cloud account, network connectivity |
| Simulation mode | Yes — dry-run policy evaluation | IAM Policy Simulator (AWS), Policy Troubleshooter (GCP) |
| Offline operation | Yes — runs entirely locally | No — requires connectivity to cloud control plane |

The Local Blind Spot

Cloud IAM excels at what it was built for: governing cloud API access. The problem is that AI agents operate across boundaries:

  1. An agent reads a local .env file containing API keys. Cloud IAM cannot prevent this because the read happens on the local filesystem, not through a cloud API.
  2. An agent executes curl to exfiltrate data to an external endpoint. Cloud IAM governs VPC egress rules but cannot inspect or gate individual HTTP requests from a local process.
  3. An agent runs rm -rf /data/ on the host machine. Cloud IAM has no concept of local shell commands.
SafeClaw fills this gap by gating every local action the agent attempts, regardless of whether it involves cloud resources.

Key Takeaways

When to Use Which

Use SafeClaw when:


Use Cloud IAM when:

Use both together when:

Architecture: SafeClaw + Cloud IAM

[AI Agent]
    |
    ├── Local Actions ──> [SafeClaw Policy Engine] ──> Allow / Deny / Escalate
    |                           |
    |                    [Tamper-proof Audit Trail]
    |
    └── Cloud API Calls ──> [Cloud IAM] ──> Allow / Deny
                                |
                         [CloudTrail / Audit Logs]

SafeClaw handles everything that happens before the agent reaches a cloud API. Cloud IAM handles everything that happens when it does.

The Bottom Line

Cloud IAM is essential for cloud resource security but invisible to local agent actions. SafeClaw is essential for local action safety but does not manage cloud API permissions. Together, they provide complete authorization coverage for AI agent workloads. Install SafeClaw in one command: npx @authensor/safeclaw. Free tier at authensor.com.

See also: SafeClaw vs RBAC | AI Agent Permission Models Compared | SafeClaw vs Docker

Try SafeClaw

Action-level gating for AI agents. Set it up in your browser in 60 seconds.

$ npx @authensor/safeclaw