Vendor Risk Assessment for Zero-Dependency Security Tools

Regulation Overview

Vendor risk management is required across compliance frameworks: SOC 2 CC9.2 (risk from vendor relationships), ISO 27001 A.5.19–A.5.23 (supplier relationships), NIST SP 800-53 SA-9 (external system services), PCI DSS Requirement 12.8 (service provider management), and HIPAA §164.308(b)(1) (business associate agreements). When organizations adopt AI agent security tools, these tools enter the vendor risk assessment scope. The number of third-party dependencies in a security tool directly impacts the breadth and complexity of vendor risk evaluation.

Relevant Requirements

SOC 2 CC9.2 — Vendor Risk Management

The entity assesses and manages risks associated with vendors and business partners. Each third-party dependency in a security tool is a transitive vendor relationship requiring assessment.

ISO 27001 A.5.19 — Information Security in Supplier Relationships

Information security requirements must be agreed upon with each supplier. For software dependencies, this means evaluating each dependency's security posture.

ISO 27001 A.5.20 — Addressing Information Security Within Supplier Agreements

Relevant information security requirements must be established and agreed with each supplier. Transitive dependencies create implicit supplier relationships.

NIST SP 800-53 SA-9 — External System Services

The organization requires external system service providers to comply with organizational information security requirements. Each npm package or library is an external service provider.

NIST SP 800-53 SR-3 — Supply Chain Controls and Processes

The organization employs supply chain controls and processes to protect against supply chain risks. This directly addresses dependency-based attack vectors.

PCI DSS Requirement 12.8 — Service Provider Management

A list of all service providers with which cardholder data is shared must be maintained, along with a written agreement acknowledging responsibility for security. Software dependencies that process data are service providers.

HIPAA §164.308(b)(1) — Business Associate Contracts

A covered entity must have contracts with business associates ensuring PHI protection. Third-party code processing PHI constitutes a business associate relationship.

Executive Order 14028 — Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity

Section 4 requires Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) for software sold to the federal government. Every dependency must be enumerated and assessed.

Compliance Gap Without Zero Dependencies

Security tools with third-party dependencies create these vendor risk challenges:

| Risk Category | Impact of Dependencies |
|---|---|
| Supply chain attacks | Compromised dependencies inject malicious code (e.g., event-stream, ua-parser-js, colors.js incidents) |
| Transitive risk | A tool with 10 direct dependencies may have 100+ transitive dependencies, each a potential attack vector |
| SBOM complexity | Each dependency must be enumerated, versioned, and tracked for vulnerability management |
| Vendor assessment scope | Each dependency maintainer is effectively a sub-vendor requiring due diligence |
| License compliance | Transitive dependencies may introduce incompatible licenses (GPL, AGPL) |
| Update liability | Dependency updates may introduce breaking changes or new vulnerabilities |
| Audit burden | Auditors must verify the security posture of every dependency in the chain |
| Abandonment risk | Unmaintained dependencies accumulate unpatched CVEs |

Typical npm Package Dependency Counts

For context on supply chain scope:

| Package Type | Typical Direct Dependencies | Typical Transitive Dependencies |
|---|---|---|
| Express.js web framework | 30+ | 200+ |
| Next.js framework | 60+ | 700+ |
| Typical security middleware | 5–15 | 50–150 |
| SafeClaw | 0 | 0 |

How SafeClaw Addresses Each Requirement

| Framework | Vendor Risk Requirement | SafeClaw Capability |
|---|---|---|
| SOC 2 CC9.2 | Assess vendor relationships | Zero third-party dependencies means zero transitive vendor relationships to assess. The only vendor is Authensor (SafeClaw publisher). |
| ISO 27001 A.5.19 | Supplier security requirements | No supplier code executes within SafeClaw. 100% of code is authored by Authensor and auditable under MIT license. |
| ISO 27001 A.5.20 | Supplier agreement management | No supplier agreements needed for dependencies. SBOM contains exactly one entry: SafeClaw itself. |
| NIST SA-9 | External service provider compliance | No external code services used. All functionality implemented internally and verified by 446 tests. |
| NIST SR-3 | Supply chain controls | Zero-dependency architecture eliminates supply chain attack surface entirely. No npm packages to compromise. |
| PCI DSS 12.8 | Service provider listing | Service provider list for SafeClaw integration: Authensor only. No transitive service providers. |
| HIPAA §164.308(b)(1) | Business associate contracts | Single BAA with Authensor covers the complete tool. No third-party code touches PHI. |
| EO 14028 | Software Bill of Materials | SBOM is trivially complete: one package, zero dependencies, fully enumerable. |

Evidence Generation

| Assessment Area | Evidence Required | SafeClaw Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Dependency inventory | Complete list of all dependencies | package.json showing zero dependencies; npm audit returning zero findings |
| SBOM | Machine-readable software bill of materials | Single-entry SBOM in CycloneDX or SPDX format |
| Vulnerability scanning | CVE scan results for all components | Scan of single package; no transitive CVEs possible |
| License analysis | License inventory for all dependencies | MIT license only; no transitive license conflicts |
| Code audit scope | Lines of code requiring security review | Entire codebase auditable; no external code to review |
| Supply chain integrity | Verification of package authenticity | npm provenance; single-publisher verification |
| Maintenance status | Evidence of active maintenance | Test suite (446 tests), TypeScript strict mode compilation, version history |

Vendor Risk Scoring

Using a standard vendor risk assessment framework:

| Risk Factor | Typical Security Tool (with dependencies) | SafeClaw (zero dependencies) |
|---|---|---|
| Supply chain attack surface | High (100+ transitive packages) | None (0 dependencies) |
| SBOM completeness confidence | Low (deep dependency trees hard to fully enumerate) | Complete (single entry) |
| CVE remediation speed | Slow (depends on upstream maintainers) | Direct (all code owned by vendor) |
| License risk | Medium (transitive license conflicts possible) | None (MIT only) |
| Vendor concentration risk | Distributed across many maintainers | Single vendor (Authensor) |
| Code auditability | Difficult (must audit all dependencies) | Full (100% open source, MIT license) |
| Abandonment risk | High for individual dependencies | Low (single maintained product) |

Example Policy

A vendor risk assessment questionnaire response template for SafeClaw:

{
  "vendor": "Authensor",
  "product": "SafeClaw",
  "install": "npx @authensor/safeclaw",
  "license": "MIT",
  "directDependencies": 0,
  "transitiveDependencies": 0,
  "testCoverage": "446 tests, TypeScript strict mode",
  "dataHandling": "Action metadata only — never file contents, credentials, or sensitive data",
  "dataResidency": "Local execution — policy evaluation runs on customer infrastructure",
  "codeAuditability": "100% open source — full source code available for audit",
  "sbomFormat": "CycloneDX 1.4",
  "sbomEntries": 1,
  "knownVulnerabilities": 0,
  "subProcessors": [],
  "encryptionAtRest": "SHA-256 hash chain for audit trail integrity",
  "authentication": "API key per agent instance, 7-day renewable",
  "freeTier": "Available — 7-day renewable keys, no credit card required"
}

The deny-by-default architecture means the tool's default state introduces no risk — it blocks all agent actions until explicitly configured. Sub-millisecond policy evaluation ensures no performance impact on protected systems.

Audit Trail Export

For vendor risk assessment documentation:

1. Run npm audit on the SafeClaw package to confirm zero vulnerabilities from zero dependencies
2. Generate SBOM — Single-entry bill of materials confirming no third-party code
3. Export test results — 446 tests verify enforcement correctness without relying on external test frameworks beyond development dependencies
4. Provide license analysis — MIT license only, no transitive license obligations
5. Document data flow — Control plane receives action metadata only, never sensitive data
6. Export audit trail from safeclaw.onrender.com with SHA-256 hash chain verification for tamper-proof evidence

Cross-References

• Zero-Dependency Security Definition — Technical explanation of zero-dependency architecture
• Test Coverage Reference — 446-test suite details
• Security Model Reference — Deny-by-default architecture
• ISO 27001 Agent Security — A.5.19–A.5.23 supplier controls mapping
• PCI DSS Agent Access — Requirement 12.8 service provider management