Safety Controls for AI Code Generation Agents

AI code generation agents — tools like Claude Code, Cursor Agent, Copilot Workspace, and custom LangChain coding agents — can write files, execute shell commands, install packages, and modify git history, making them the highest-risk agent category for developers who grant them access to their codebase. SafeClaw by Authensor provides granular safety controls specifically designed for code generation workflows: file-path scoping, shell command whitelisting, package installation gating, and secret detection. Install with npx @authensor/safeclaw to gate your coding agent in under 60 seconds.

The Code Generation Threat Model

A coding agent with unrestricted access can:

1. Write to any file — including .env, package.json, CI/CD configs, deployment manifests
2. Execute any shell command — rm -rf /, curl | bash, git push --force
3. Install arbitrary packages — introducing supply chain vulnerabilities
4. Read secrets — API keys, database credentials, SSH keys
5. Modify git history — force-push, rebase, delete branches

  ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │  AI Coding Agent Capabilities                 │
  │                                               │
  │  file_read ──▶ Can read .env, SSH keys        │
  │  file_write ──▶ Can overwrite any file         │
  │  shell_exec ──▶ Can run destructive commands   │
  │  npm_install ──▶ Can add malicious packages    │
  │  git_ops ──▶ Can push to production            │
  │                                               │
  │  SafeClaw gates EVERY one of these actions     │
  └──────────────────────────────────────────────┘

SafeClaw Policy for Code Generation

Here is a production-ready policy for a typical coding agent:

# safeclaw-code-agent.yaml
version: "1.0"
agent: code-generator
rules:
  # === FILE READS ===
  - action: file_read
    path: "src/**"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_read
    path: "tests/**"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_read
    path: "package.json"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_read
    path: "tsconfig.json"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_read
    path: "*/.env"
    decision: deny
  - action: file_read
    path: "*/secret*"
    decision: deny
  - action: file_read
    path: "/.ssh/"
    decision: deny
  - action: file_read
    decision: deny

# === FILE WRITES ===
  - action: file_write
    path: "src/**"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_write
    path: "tests/**"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_write
    path: ".github/**"
    decision: deny    # No CI/CD modifications
  - action: file_write
    path: "package.json"
    decision: deny    # No dependency changes without review
  - action: file_write
    decision: deny

# === SHELL COMMANDS ===
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "npm test"
    decision: allow
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "npm run build"
    decision: allow
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "npm run lint"
    decision: allow
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "npx jest **"
    decision: allow
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "npx tsc --noEmit"
    decision: allow
  - action: shell_execute
    decision: deny

# === GIT OPERATIONS ===
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "git diff**"
    decision: allow
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "git status"
    decision: allow
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "git log**"
    decision: allow
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "git add **"
    decision: allow
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "git commit**"
    decision: allow
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "git push**"
    decision: deny    # No pushing without human review
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "git push --force**"
    decision: deny

# === NETWORK ===
  - action: network_request
    decision: deny

# === FILE DELETION ===
  - action: file_delete
    decision: deny

Key Design Decisions

Why Deny package.json Writes

A coding agent that can modify package.json can introduce any npm package, including typosquatted or malicious ones. By denying package.json writes, you force package additions through human review.

Why Deny Git Push

The agent can commit locally (useful for checkpointing work) but cannot push to remote. This ensures a human reviews the diff before code reaches the repository.

Why Deny Network Requests

Code generation agents should not need network access during execution. If the agent can make HTTP requests, a prompt injection can exfiltrate code or secrets. Deny network by default.

Secret Detection in Written Files

SafeClaw can inspect file write contents for common secret patterns before allowing the write:

content_inspection:
  deny_patterns:
    - "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"           # AWS access keys
    - "sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48}"         # OpenAI API keys
    - "ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}"        # GitHub PATs
    - "-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY-----" # Private keys
  on_match: deny_and_alert

This prevents the agent from accidentally writing hardcoded secrets into source files, even if the LLM generates them.

Integration with Popular Coding Agents

SafeClaw works with Claude Code, Cursor Agent Mode, and any OpenAI-based coding assistant. The integration is provider-agnostic — wrap the tool executor, and SafeClaw handles the gating. With 446 tests, hash-chained audit logging, and MIT licensing, it provides enterprise-grade safety for code generation without vendor lock-in.

Cross-References

• Safe Claude Code Setup
• Safe Cursor Agent Setup
• Preventing API Key Exfiltration
• npm Install Malware Prevention
• Git Force Push Prevention