Safety Controls for AI Documentation Agents

AI documentation agents — systems that generate, update, and maintain technical documentation, API references, README files, and knowledge bases by reading source code and producing markdown or HTML — seem low-risk compared to coding or infrastructure agents, but they still require safety controls because they read your entire codebase (including secrets), write files that may be published publicly, and can accidentally leak internal implementation details into public-facing documentation. SafeClaw by Authensor provides documentation-specific safety controls: read-only source access with secret exclusion, write-path restrictions to documentation directories, and content inspection that catches accidental secret disclosure. Install with npx @authensor/safeclaw.

Why Documentation Agents Need Safety Controls

The common assumption is "it just writes docs, what could go wrong?" Here is what can go wrong:

  ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │  DOCUMENTATION AGENT RISKS                        │
  │                                                    │
  │  1. Secret Leakage                                 │
  │     Agent reads .env file, includes API key         │
  │     in generated API documentation                  │
  │                                                    │
  │  2. Internal Detail Exposure                       │
  │     Agent documents internal architecture,          │
  │     attack surfaces, or security mechanisms         │
  │     in public-facing docs                           │
  │                                                    │
  │  3. Source Code Modification                       │
  │     Agent "helpfully" fixes a code comment          │
  │     by modifying the source file                    │
  │                                                    │
  │  4. Overwriting Critical Files                     │
  │     Agent overwrites existing docs with             │
  │     hallucinated content                            │
  │                                                    │
  │  5. Publishing Trigger                             │
  │     Agent runs a build command that publishes       │
  │     docs to the public website                      │
  └──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

SafeClaw Policy for Documentation Agents

# safeclaw-docs-agent.yaml
version: "1.0"
agent: documentation
rules:
  # === SOURCE CODE READS (for understanding, not modification) ===
  - action: file_read
    path: "src/**"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_read
    path: "lib/**"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_read
    path: "tests/**"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_read
    path: "package.json"
    decision: allow

# === SECRET FILES (never read) ===
  - action: file_read
    path: "*/.env"
    decision: deny
  - action: file_read
    path: "*/secret*"
    decision: deny
  - action: file_read
    path: "*/credential*"
    decision: deny
  - action: file_read
    path: "/.ssh/"
    decision: deny
  - action: file_read
    path: "*/config/production."
    decision: deny

# === DOCUMENTATION READS ===
  - action: file_read
    path: "docs/**"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_read
    path: "*.md"
    decision: allow

# === DOCUMENTATION WRITES (docs directory ONLY) ===
  - action: file_write
    path: "docs/**"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_write
    path: "README.md"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_write
    path: "CHANGELOG.md"
    decision: allow
  - action: file_write
    decision: deny   # Cannot write to source code or other files

# === SHELL (minimal, read-only tools) ===
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "npx typedoc**"
    decision: allow   # Generate API docs from types
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "npm run docs:build"
    decision: allow   # Build documentation site locally
  - action: shell_execute
    command: "npm run docs:deploy**"
    decision: deny    # Never auto-deploy docs
  - action: shell_execute
    decision: deny

# === NETWORK ===
  - action: network_request
    decision: deny

# === FILE DELETION ===
  - action: file_delete
    decision: deny

Content Inspection for Secret Leakage

The agent reads source code that may contain inline secrets. Even with .env excluded, hardcoded credentials in source files can leak into documentation. SafeClaw inspects written content:

content_inspection:
  enabled: true
  deny_patterns:
    - "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"             # AWS access keys
    - "sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48}"           # OpenAI API keys
    - "ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}"          # GitHub PATs
    - "-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY-----"  # Private keys
    - "mongodb\\+srv://[^\\s]+"      # Database connection strings
    - "postgres://[^\\s]+"           # Postgres connection strings
  on_match: deny_and_alert

If the agent generates a markdown file containing a pattern matching an AWS key, the file write is denied and an alert is generated.

Preventing Internal Detail Exposure

Documentation agents can inadvertently document attack surfaces or security mechanisms. Use content pattern matching to flag sensitive topics:

content_review:
  flag_patterns:
    - "internal only"
    - "security mechanism"
    - "attack surface"
    - "vulnerability"
    - "backdoor"
    - "admin endpoint"
  on_match: require_human_review

Flagged content is not automatically denied — it is queued for human review, allowing the documentation team to decide what is appropriate for public-facing documentation.

Write Scope Isolation

The documentation agent has a clear boundary: it writes to docs/, README.md, and CHANGELOG.md. It cannot:

• Modify source files (even to "fix" a comment)
• Write to CI/CD configuration
• Create files outside the documentation directory
• Delete any files

Cross-References

• Content Generation Agent Recipe
• Preventing API Key Exfiltration
• Credential File Read Threat
• Environment File Access Prevention