AI Agent Used the Wrong API Key: How to Prevent Credential Misuse

When an AI agent uses the wrong API key — sending requests with your production key instead of a test key, accessing the wrong account's resources, or exposing a key through logs or network requests — the consequences range from unexpected billing to a full security breach. SafeClaw by Authensor prevents credential misuse by blocking agent access to environment files, secrets, and credential stores by default. If the wrong key has already been used, follow the response steps below and then implement credential gating policies.

Immediate Response

1. Rotate the Compromised Key

Do this first, before anything else:

• Go to the API provider's dashboard (OpenAI, AWS, Stripe, etc.)
• Revoke the compromised key
• Generate a new key
• Update your application's environment variables with the new key

2. Check for Unauthorized Usage

Review the API provider's usage logs for the compromised key:

• Were there requests you did not initiate?
• Were there requests to endpoints your agent should not have called?
• Was data accessed or modified through the wrong key?

3. Review the SafeClaw Audit Log

npx @authensor/safeclaw audit --filter "action:file.read" --filter "resource:.env" --last 20
npx @authensor/safeclaw audit --filter "action:network" --last 30

The hash-chained audit trail shows whether the agent read credential files and which network requests included API keys.

4. Check for Key Exposure

Search your codebase, logs, and git history for the compromised key:

git log -p --all -S 'YOUR_KEY_PREFIX'

If the key appears in git history, it has been exposed. See the related guide on recovering from pushed secrets.

Install SafeClaw and Protect Credentials

npx @authensor/safeclaw

Block Access to Credential Files

Add these rules to your safeclaw.policy.yaml:

rules:
  # Block all access to environment files
  - action: file.read
    resource: "*/.env"
    effect: deny
    reason: "Agents must not read environment files"

- action: file.write
    resource: "*/.env"
    effect: deny
    reason: "Agents must not write environment files"

# Block access to credential files
  - action: file.read
    resource: "*/credentials*"
    effect: deny
    reason: "Credential files are off limits"

- action: file.read
    resource: "*/secret*"
    effect: deny
    reason: "Secret files are off limits"

- action: file.read
    resource: "/.aws/"
    effect: deny
    reason: "AWS credentials are off limits"

- action: file.read
    resource: "/.ssh/"
    effect: deny
    reason: "SSH keys are off limits"

- action: file.read
    resource: "*/key*.pem"
    effect: deny
    reason: "Key files are off limits"

Block Network Requests That Include Credentials

Prevent agents from sending credentials to unauthorized endpoints:

rules:
  - action: network.request
    resource: "*"
    effect: allow
    deny_headers:
      - "Authorization"
      - "X-API-Key"
    reason: "Agent cannot send auth headers to arbitrary endpoints"

- action: network.request
    resource: "https://api.your-service.com/**"
    effect: allow
    reason: "Agent can call your API with credentials"

Prevent Shell Access to Environment Variables

Agents can also read credentials through shell commands:

rules:
  - action: shell.exec
    resource: "env"
    effect: deny
    reason: "Block listing environment variables"

- action: shell.exec
    resource: "printenv*"
    effect: deny
    reason: "Block printing environment variables"

- action: shell.exec
    resource: "echo $*"
    effect: deny
    reason: "Block echoing env vars"

Troubleshooting Scenarios

Agent used production key instead of test key: This happens when both keys are in the same .env file and the agent reads the wrong one. Solution: block all .env access and inject only the test key into the agent's execution environment.

Agent logged the API key in console output: Search your logs and clear them. Add a policy rule that blocks the agent from writing to log files if they might contain credentials.

Agent included the key in a commit message or code comment: Rotate the key immediately and scrub git history. See the guide on recovering from pushed secrets.

Agent sent the key to an external AI service: If the agent forwarded your credentials to another LLM provider for sub-processing, rotate immediately and block network access to unauthorized AI endpoints.

Prevention Best Practices

1. Never store credentials in files the agent can access. Use a secrets manager or inject credentials through environment variables that are scoped per-process.
2. Use SafeClaw's deny-by-default to block all credential file access.
3. Scope API keys — give agents keys with minimal permissions (read-only, specific endpoints only).
4. Monitor key usage through your API provider's dashboard.
5. Rotate keys regularly as a preventive measure.

Related Resources

• Prevent Agent Env File Access
• Prevent Agent SSH Key Access
• Threat: API Key Exfiltration
• AI Agent Leaked Environment Variables: Emergency Rotation Guide
• AI Agent Pushed Secrets to GitHub: Emergency Response