2026-01-05 · Authensor

AI Agent Safety for Legal Document Processing

Industry Context

Law firms and legal departments are deploying AI agents for contract review, legal research, document drafting, due diligence analysis, and e-discovery processing. These agents operate on systems containing attorney-client privileged communications, work product materials, personally identifiable information of clients and opposing parties, and sealed court documents. An unauthorized agent action that transmits privileged material to an external endpoint or modifies a filed document can waive privilege, violate court orders, or breach client confidentiality obligations.

Legal AI agents frequently interact with document management systems (iManage, NetDocuments), e-discovery platforms (Relativity, Nuix), contract lifecycle management tools, and case management databases. The volume of sensitive documents — often millions of pages per matter — makes automated processing necessary but simultaneously increases the blast radius of uncontrolled agent actions.

Risk Profile

The highest-risk agent actions in legal environments include:

Regulatory Landscape

Legal AI agents operate under professional ethics rules, data protection regulations, and court-specific requirements:

ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct — Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information) requires lawyers to make reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized disclosure of client information. Rule 1.6(c) specifically requires lawyers to take reasonable measures to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure when using technology. AI agents with uncontrolled tool access violate this obligation.

ABA Formal Opinion 498 (2021) — Addresses virtual practice and technology competence. Lawyers must understand the technology they use, including AI tools, and implement reasonable safeguards for client data.

State Bar Ethics Rules — Each US jurisdiction has adopted variations of ABA Model Rules. California Rule 1.6, New York Rule 1.6, and Illinois Rule 1.6 all require reasonable measures to protect client information processed by technology systems.

GDPR (EU General Data Protection Regulation) — Articles 5, 6, and 9 govern processing of personal data. Legal matters involving EU data subjects require lawful basis for processing, purpose limitation, and data minimization. AI agents must not process personal data beyond what is necessary for the specific legal task.

Attorney-Client Privilege (Federal Rule of Evidence 502) — Inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials may waive privilege unless the holder took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure (FRE 502(b)). Action-level gating on AI agents constitutes a reasonable preventive step.

Court-Specific Protective Orders — Many litigation matters involve protective orders restricting who can access designated confidential, attorneys-eyes-only, or highly confidential materials. AI agents must not access documents beyond the permitted designation level.

UK Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) Standards — Paragraph 6.3 requires effective governance structures and systems for safeguarding client information. Paragraph 6.5 requires confidentiality of client affairs.

Recommended Policy Template

# SafeClaw Policy — Legal / Document Processing Environment

Deny-by-default. Attorney-client privilege protection enforced.

rules:
# DENY: Block access to privileged communications
- action: file_read
target: "/privileged/"
decision: DENY
reason: "Attorney-client privileged material — ABA Rule 1.6"

- action: file_read
target: "/work-product/"
decision: DENY
reason: "Work product doctrine protection"

- action: file_write
target: "/filed-documents/"
decision: DENY
reason: "Executed/filed documents are immutable"

- action: file_write
target: "/executed-contracts/"
decision: DENY
reason: "Executed contracts cannot be modified"

# DENY: Block credential and config access
- action: file_read
target: "**/.env"
decision: DENY
reason: "Credential access blocked"

- action: file_read
target: "/credentials/"
decision: DENY
reason: "API key access blocked"

# DENY: Block external network requests
- action: network
target: "https://api.openai.com/**"
decision: DENY
reason: "External AI API blocked — privilege risk"

- action: shell_exec
target: "rm -rf*"
decision: DENY
reason: "Destructive command blocked"

- action: shell_exec
target: "curl*"
decision: DENY
reason: "External data transmission blocked"

# REQUIRE_APPROVAL: Contract drafting and document edits
- action: file_write
target: "/drafts/"
decision: REQUIRE_APPROVAL
reason: "Draft modifications require attorney review"

# REQUIRE_APPROVAL: Access to e-discovery materials
- action: file_read
target: "/ediscovery/"
decision: REQUIRE_APPROVAL
reason: "E-discovery access requires matter-level authorization"

# REQUIRE_APPROVAL: Database queries on case management
- action: shell_exec
target: "querycase*"
decision: REQUIRE_APPROVAL
reason: "Case database queries require approval"

# ALLOW: Read approved research materials
- action: file_read
target: "/legal/research/**"
decision: ALLOW

# ALLOW: Read public legal databases
- action: network
target: "https://www.law.cornell.edu/**"
decision: ALLOW

- action: network
target: "https://scholar.google.com/**"
decision: ALLOW

# ALLOW: Read project source code
- action: file_read
target: "/app/src/**"
decision: ALLOW

# ALLOW: Run tests
- action: shell_exec
target: "npm test*"
decision: ALLOW

Example Scenarios

| # | Agent Action | Decision | Rationale |
|---|-------------|----------|-----------|
| 1 | Agent reads /legal/research/case-law-summary.md for legal research | ALLOW | Approved research directory, no privileged material |
| 2 | Agent reads /privileged/litigation-strategy-memo.docx | DENY | Attorney-client privileged material — disclosure would risk privilege waiver under FRE 502 |
| 3 | Agent writes revised clause to /drafts/contract-v3.docx | REQUIRE_APPROVAL | Draft document modification requires attorney review before persistence |
| 4 | Agent sends document content to https://api.openai.com/v1/chat | DENY | External AI API transmission of potentially privileged material blocked |
| 5 | Agent attempts to modify /filed-documents/motion-to-dismiss.pdf | DENY | Filed court documents are immutable — modification would violate court rules |

Implementation Notes

SafeClaw provides action-level gating that satisfies ABA Rule 1.6(c) reasonable measures requirements. Every agent action is evaluated against policy before execution. The deny-by-default architecture prevents novel attack vectors, including prompt injection attempts that try to exfiltrate privileged documents via tool calls.

The tamper-proof audit trail (SHA-256 hash chain) creates an immutable record of every action attempted by every agent. This record demonstrates that reasonable steps were taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure, which is the standard under FRE 502(b) for maintaining privilege despite inadvertent production. Audit logs can be exported from the browser dashboard.

SafeClaw has zero third-party dependencies and is 100% open source (MIT license) with 446 tests in TypeScript strict mode. The control plane receives only action metadata — never document content, client names, or privileged communications. Sub-millisecond policy evaluation ensures no perceptible delay during document processing workflows.

Install with npx @authensor/safeclaw. The free tier includes 7-day renewable keys with no credit card required. Use simulation mode to validate policies against real document processing workflows before enforcement.

Cross-References

Try SafeClaw

Action-level gating for AI agents. Set it up in your browser in 60 seconds.

$ npx @authensor/safeclaw