How to Safely Run Autonomous Coding Agents

To safely run autonomous coding agents, add SafeClaw action-level gating. Install with npx @authensor/safeclaw and define a deny-by-default policy that controls every file write, shell command, and network request the agent makes. Autonomous coding agents — Devin, SWE-Agent, OpenHands (formerly OpenDevin), Aider, and similar systems — operate for extended periods without human supervision. They clone repositories, read code, write patches, run tests, install dependencies, execute shell commands, and push changes, all from a single issue description or task prompt.

What Autonomous Coding Agents Can Do (And Why That's Risky)

Fully autonomous coding agents have the broadest capability surface of any AI tool category:

• Full shell access — agents like SWE-Agent and OpenHands run in environments with unrestricted shell access. They execute git, pip, npm, make, docker, curl, and any other command available in the environment.
• Unrestricted file system operations — agents read, write, create, delete, and move files anywhere the OS permissions allow. They modify source code, configuration files, build scripts, CI manifests, and deployment configs.
• Git operations including push — agents clone repos, create branches, commit changes, and push to remotes. A misconfigured agent can force-push to main or push credentials in committed files.
• Package installation — agents install dependencies from public registries. Install scripts from these packages execute with the agent's permissions and can run arbitrary code.
• Network access — agents make HTTP requests for documentation, APIs, and downloads. Generated code can also make network requests at runtime.
• Long-running unsupervised sessions — an autonomous agent might run for 30 minutes to several hours on a single task. During that time, it makes hundreds of individual actions with no human review.
• Multi-step reasoning with tool use — agents plan, execute, observe, and iterate. A single error in the plan can cascade into dozens of unintended actions before the agent recognizes the mistake.
• Environment modification — agents modify shell configuration (.bashrc, .profile), install system packages, change environment variables, and alter the execution environment itself.

Step-by-Step Setup

Step 1: Install SafeClaw

npx @authensor/safeclaw

For autonomous agents, select SDK Wrapper or Environment Hook depending on the agent framework.

Step 2: Get Your API Key

Visit safeclaw.onrender.com. Free-tier keys renew every 7 days, no credit card.

Step 3: Integration by Agent Type

For SWE-Agent and OpenHands — these agents run in Docker containers or sandboxed environments. Add SafeClaw as an environment-level interceptor:

# In the agent's Docker entrypoint or setup script:
npx @authensor/safeclaw init --mode environment-hook \
  --api-key $SAFECLAW_API_KEY \
  --policy /workspace/safeclaw.policy.yaml

This installs shell hooks that evaluate every command before execution.

For Devin and cloud-hosted agents — configure SafeClaw as a proxy for the agent's tool calls:

import { SafeClaw } from "@authensor/safeclaw";

const safeclaw = new SafeClaw({
  apiKey: process.env.SAFECLAW_API_KEY,
  policy: "./safeclaw.policy.yaml",
});

// Wrap the agent's action interface
const guardedActions = {
  writeFile: safeclaw.guard("file_write", originalActions.writeFile),
  readFile: safeclaw.guard("file_read", originalActions.readFile),
  runCommand: safeclaw.guard("shell_exec", originalActions.runCommand),
  httpRequest: safeclaw.guard("network", originalActions.httpRequest),
};

For Aider — Aider operates through git and file edits. Wrap its file operations:

# Run Aider with SafeClaw environment hooks active
npx @authensor/safeclaw exec -- aider --model gpt-4

Step 4: Define Your Policy

This policy is restrictive by design — autonomous agents need tight boundaries:

version: 1
default: deny

rules:
  # File reads: project directory only
  - action: file_read
    path: "${PROJECT_DIR}/**"
    effect: allow

- action: file_read
    path: "*/.env"
    effect: deny

- action: file_read
    path: "/.ssh/"
    effect: deny

- action: file_read
    path: "**/.git/config"
    effect: deny

- action: file_read
    path: "*/secret*"
    effect: deny

- action: file_read
    path: "*/credential*"
    effect: deny

# File writes: source and tests only
  - action: file_write
    path: "${PROJECT_DIR}/src/**"
    effect: allow

- action: file_write
    path: "${PROJECT_DIR}/tests/**"
    effect: allow

- action: file_write
    path: "${PROJECT_DIR}/test/**"
    effect: allow

- action: file_write
    path: "${PROJECT_DIR}/.github/**"
    effect: deny

- action: file_write
    path: "${PROJECT_DIR}/Dockerfile"
    effect: deny

- action: file_write
    path: "**/.bashrc"
    effect: deny

- action: file_write
    path: "**/.profile"
    effect: deny

# Shell commands: explicit allowlist
  - action: shell_exec
    command: "python*"
    effect: allow

- action: shell_exec
    command: "node*"
    effect: allow

- action: shell_exec
    command: "npm test*"
    effect: allow

- action: shell_exec
    command: "npm run build*"
    effect: allow

- action: shell_exec
    command: "git diff*"
    effect: allow

- action: shell_exec
    command: "git status"
    effect: allow

- action: shell_exec
    command: "git add*"
    effect: allow

- action: shell_exec
    command: "git commit*"
    effect: allow

- action: shell_exec
    command: "git push --force*"
    effect: deny

- action: shell_exec
    command: "rm -rf*"
    effect: deny

- action: shell_exec
    command: "pip install*"
    effect: deny

- action: shell_exec
    command: "npm install*"
    effect: deny

- action: shell_exec
    command: "curl*"
    effect: deny

- action: shell_exec
    command: "wget*"
    effect: deny

- action: shell_exec
    command: "chmod*"
    effect: deny

- action: shell_exec
    command: "chown*"
    effect: deny

- action: shell_exec
    command: "sudo*"
    effect: deny

# Network: deny all by default
  - action: network
    host: "api.openai.com"
    effect: allow

- action: network
    host: "api.anthropic.com"
    effect: allow

- action: network
    host: "*"
    effect: deny

Step 5: Simulate Extensively

npx @authensor/safeclaw simulate --policy safeclaw.policy.yaml

Run the agent against several test tasks. Autonomous agents generate high volumes of actions — review the full simulation log before enforcing. Pay particular attention to multi-step chains where one blocked action might cause the agent to try alternative (and potentially riskier) approaches.

What Gets Blocked, What Gets Through

ALLOWED — Agent reads source code:

{ "action": "file_read", "path": "/project/src/utils/parser.py", "verdict": "ALLOW" }

DENIED — Agent reads git credentials:

{ "action": "file_read", "path": "/home/agent/.git/config", "verdict": "DENY", "reason": "path matches **/.git/config deny rule" }

ALLOWED — Agent commits its changes:

{ "action": "shell_exec", "command": "git commit -m 'Fix parser edge case'", "verdict": "ALLOW" }

DENIED — Agent tries sudo:

{ "action": "shell_exec", "command": "sudo apt-get install libxml2-dev", "verdict": "DENY", "reason": "sudo* matches deny rule" }

DENIED — Agent curls external endpoint:

{ "action": "network", "host": "pastebin.com", "verdict": "DENY", "reason": "host not in allowlist, default deny" }

Without SafeClaw vs With SafeClaw

| Scenario | Without SafeClaw | With SafeClaw |
|---|---|---|
| Agent runs for 2 hours, executes 300+ actions | All 300+ actions execute without review | Each action individually evaluated — policy violations blocked in real time |
| Agent installs a dependency with a malicious postinstall script | Package installed, script executes | Blocked — npm install and pip install match deny rules |
| Agent modifies .bashrc to add PATH entries | Shell config changed, persists across sessions | Blocked — **/.bashrc is denied for writes |
| Agent reads .ssh/id_rsa for git authentication context | Private key loaded into agent context | Blocked — /.ssh/ is denied for reads |
| Agent writes fix to src/utils/parser.py | File written normally | Allowed — src/** is in write allowlist |

SafeClaw evaluates every action in sub-millisecond time, adding negligible overhead even for agents executing hundreds of actions per session. The tamper-proof audit trail (SHA-256 hash chain) provides a complete record of every action and verdict. The control plane sees only action metadata — never your repository code, credentials, or agent configuration. SafeClaw runs with zero third-party dependencies, is validated by 446 tests under TypeScript strict mode, and the client is 100% open source (MIT license).

Cross-References

• What is SafeClaw? — Deny-by-default action gating fundamentals
• How to Safely Use Claude Code — Claude Code as a coding agent with SafeClaw
• How to Safely Run AutoGen Agents — AutoGen code executors with policy gating
• How to Safely Run LangChain Agents — LangChain tool wrapping patterns
• How to Safely Run MCP Tool Servers — MCP tool gating for agents using MCP