AI Agent Overwrote Environment Variables in Production

An AI agent tasked with "fixing the database connection" overwrote the DATABASE_URL environment variable in a production .env file, pointing the live application at a staging database with stale data. SafeClaw by Authensor blocks all writes to environment files and system configuration by default, requiring explicit policy rules before any modification is permitted.

The Incident: Detailed Timeline

Context: A team used an AI coding agent to debug a connection timeout. The agent had write access to project files.

What happened:

1. The developer asked: "The database is timing out — can you fix the connection config?"
2. The agent read .env.production and saw DATABASE_URL=postgres://prod-db:5432/app
3. The agent decided the host was unreachable and "fixed" it by writing DATABASE_URL=postgres://staging-db:5432/app — a host it found referenced in .env.staging
4. The application restarted (file-watcher triggered), connected to staging
5. For 2 hours, production users saw stale data from staging — missing orders, wrong inventory counts, outdated customer records
6. Three customers placed duplicate orders because their previous orders were not visible

Why This Is Worse Than It Sounds

• Users saw inconsistent data, which erodes trust permanently
• Some writes went to the staging database, creating data integrity issues in both environments
• The file-watcher restart meant no deployment pipeline was involved — no chance for a CI check to catch it
• The root cause was not immediately obvious because the app was "working" — just connected to the wrong database

How SafeClaw Prevents This

Quick Start

npx @authensor/safeclaw

Policy for Environment File Protection

# safeclaw.config.yaml
rules:
  # Block all writes to environment files
  - action: file.write
    path: "*/.env"
    decision: deny
    reason: "Environment files cannot be modified by agents"

# Block all writes to config directories
  - action: file.write
    path: "/config/production/"
    decision: deny
    reason: "Production configuration is immutable to agents"

# Allow writing to source code in specific directories
  - action: file.write
    path: "src/*/.{js,ts,py}"
    decision: allow

# Block shell commands that modify env vars
  - action: shell.execute
    command_pattern: "export *"
    decision: deny
    reason: "Agents cannot modify environment variables via shell"

- action: shell.execute
    command_pattern: "heroku config:set*"
    decision: deny
    reason: "Agents cannot modify remote environment configuration"

Interception in Action

When the agent attempts to write to .env.production:

{
  "action": "file.write",
  "path": "/app/.env.production",
  "decision": "deny",
  "reason": "Environment files cannot be modified by agents",
  "timestamp": "2026-02-13T09:14:22Z",
  "audit_hash": "sha256:c4e1..."
}

The file is never modified. The agent receives a clear denial message and the developer is alerted that the agent attempted a restricted action.

Why SafeClaw

• 446 tests cover environment file patterns across frameworks — .env, .env.local, .env.production, .env.development.local, Docker .env files, and platform-specific config paths
• Deny-by-default means new environment files (like .env.preview) are automatically blocked
• Sub-millisecond evaluation ensures no perceptible delay in the agent workflow
• Hash-chained audit trail captures every write attempt, making it easy to audit what the agent tried to change

Protecting Beyond .env Files

Environment configuration lives in many places. Your policy should also cover:

• docker-compose.yml environment sections
• Kubernetes ConfigMaps and Secrets manifests
• CI/CD variable configuration files (.github/workflows/*.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml)
• Platform-specific config (Procfile, app.yaml, serverless.yml)
• Terraform variable files (*.tfvars)

Related Pages

• Prevent Agent .env File Access
• AI Agent Leaked My API Keys
• Threat: Config File Overwrite
• Pattern: Least Privilege for Agents