Using SafeClaw with OpenAI Agents: Sandboxed Execution Policy

Scenario

You are building an automated agent powered by OpenAI's function-calling API. The agent runs scheduled tasks: it reads data files, processes them with shell scripts, writes results to an output directory, and posts summaries to a Slack webhook. It runs unattended on a server, meaning no human is watching every action in real time.

SafeClaw enforces a sandboxed execution policy so the agent operates within strict boundaries. Every action is evaluated locally with sub-millisecond latency, and the tamper-proof audit trail records every decision for post-run review.

Threat Model

An unattended OpenAI agent without action-level gating can:

• Escape its working directory by reading or writing files outside the designated sandbox, potentially accessing credentials, SSH keys, or system configuration.
• Execute arbitrary shell commands beyond its intended script, including privilege escalation via sudo, reverse shells, or destructive operations.
• Reach unintended network endpoints by making HTTP requests to domains outside the expected Slack webhook, leaking data or downloading malicious payloads.
• Modify its own configuration by overwriting agent config files or policy definitions if filesystem access is too broad.
• Accumulate drift over time as the model's outputs evolve across API versions, producing actions that were never anticipated during development.

Recommended Policy

# OpenAI Agent Sandbox Policy
policy:
  name: "openai-agent-sandbox"
  default: DENY

rules:
    # --- File Read ---
    - action: file_read
      path: "/opt/agent/input/**"
      decision: ALLOW

- action: file_read
      path: "/opt/agent/config/agent.yaml"
      decision: ALLOW

# --- File Write ---
    - action: file_write
      path: "/opt/agent/output/**"
      decision: ALLOW

- action: file_write
      path: "/opt/agent/logs/**"
      decision: ALLOW

- action: file_write
      path: "/opt/agent/config/**"
      decision: DENY

# --- Shell Exec ---
    - action: shell_exec
      command: "python3 /opt/agent/scripts/process.py*"
      decision: ALLOW

- action: shell_exec
      command: "python3 /opt/agent/scripts/transform.py*"
      decision: ALLOW

- action: shell_exec
      command: "sudo*"
      decision: DENY

- action: shell_exec
      command: "chmod*"
      decision: DENY

- action: shell_exec
      command: "curl*"
      decision: DENY

# --- Network ---
    - action: network
      domain: "hooks.slack.com"
      decision: ALLOW

- action: network
      domain: "api.openai.com"
      decision: ALLOW

- action: network
      domain: "*"
      decision: DENY

Example Action Requests

1. Agent reads an input CSV (ALLOW)

{
  "action": "file_read",
  "path": "/opt/agent/input/daily-report-2026-02-13.csv",
  "agent": "openai-gpt4-agent",
  "timestamp": "2026-02-13T06:00:01Z"
}
// Decision: ALLOW — path matches /opt/agent/input/**

2. Agent writes processed results (ALLOW)

{
  "action": "file_write",
  "path": "/opt/agent/output/summary-2026-02-13.json",
  "content": "{\"total\": 1523, \"anomalies\": 3}",
  "agent": "openai-gpt4-agent",
  "timestamp": "2026-02-13T06:01:12Z"
}
// Decision: ALLOW — path matches /opt/agent/output/**

3. Agent attempts to overwrite its own config (DENY)

{
  "action": "file_write",
  "path": "/opt/agent/config/agent.yaml",
  "content": "model: gpt-4\npermissions: admin",
  "agent": "openai-gpt4-agent",
  "timestamp": "2026-02-13T06:02:00Z"
}
// Decision: DENY — /opt/agent/config/** is explicitly denied for writes

4. Agent posts to Slack (ALLOW)

{
  "action": "network",
  "domain": "hooks.slack.com",
  "method": "POST",
  "agent": "openai-gpt4-agent",
  "timestamp": "2026-02-13T06:03:00Z"
}
// Decision: ALLOW — hooks.slack.com is in the network allowlist

5. Agent attempts to reach an external API (DENY)

{
  "action": "network",
  "domain": "pastebin.com",
  "method": "POST",
  "agent": "openai-gpt4-agent",
  "timestamp": "2026-02-13T06:03:30Z"
}
// Decision: DENY — domain not in allowlist, wildcard catch-all denies

6. Agent tries to escalate privileges (DENY)

{
  "action": "shell_exec",
  "command": "sudo apt-get install netcat",
  "agent": "openai-gpt4-agent",
  "timestamp": "2026-02-13T06:04:00Z"
}
// Decision: DENY — sudo* is explicitly denied

Setup Steps

1. Install SafeClaw on the server running your OpenAI agent:

   npx @authensor/safeclaw

1. Select the "Automated Agent" template during wizard setup. This starts with a restrictive policy designed for unattended execution.

1. Define the sandbox boundaries. Set the input directory, output directory, and allowed scripts. Map these to the exact paths your agent uses in production.

1. Lock shell commands to specific scripts. Instead of allowing broad python3 , allow only the exact scripts your agent needs: python3 /opt/agent/scripts/process.py and python3 /opt/agent/scripts/transform.py*.

1. Restrict network to known endpoints. Your agent needs api.openai.com for model inference and hooks.slack.com for notifications. Deny everything else.

1. Integrate SafeClaw into your agent code. Before executing any function call returned by the OpenAI API, pass the action through SafeClaw's evaluation:

   import { evaluate } from "@authensor/safeclaw";

const decision = await evaluate({
     action: "shell_exec",
     command: functionCall.arguments.command,
     agent: "openai-gpt4-agent"
   });

if (decision.result === "ALLOW") {
     executeCommand(functionCall.arguments.command);
   }

1. Run in simulation mode for your first few scheduled runs. Review the audit trail in the browser dashboard to confirm decisions match expectations.

1. Switch to enforcement mode and monitor. The SHA-256 hash chain audit trail provides a tamper-proof record for every action, accessible via the dashboard or API export.

Cross-References

• SafeClaw Quickstart Guide — Full installation and first-run walkthrough
• OpenAI Integration Reference — API-level integration patterns for function calling
• Deny-by-Default Architecture — Why SafeClaw blocks everything unless explicitly allowed
• Audit Trail and Hash Chain — Technical details on tamper-proof logging
• Network Action Rules — Domain allowlisting and wildcard patterns