2025-10-27 · Authensor

Should I Trust AI Agents with My Codebase?

No — you should not trust AI agents, and you should not need to. Trust is the wrong model for AI agent security. The correct model is verify-then-execute: every action the agent takes is checked against a policy before it runs. SafeClaw by Authensor implements this model with a deny-by-default policy engine that gates every file read, file write, shell command, and network request — so the agent operates safely without requiring your trust.

Why Trust Is the Wrong Framework

When you "trust" an AI agent, you are making a bet that:

  1. The model will always interpret instructions correctly (it will not)
  2. The model will never hallucinate a destructive action (it will)
  3. The model's training data did not include insecure patterns (it did)
  4. Prompt injection will never cause unexpected behavior (it can)
  5. The agent's context window will always contain the right information (it might not)
Every one of these assumptions has been violated in real-world incidents. Trust is a liability — verification is a control.

The Verify-Then-Execute Model

Instead of trusting the agent, define what it is permitted to do. Everything else is denied.

Developer instruction → Agent plans action → SafeClaw evaluates policy → Allow or Deny → Execute or Block

The agent never bypasses the policy engine. It cannot opt out of verification. Every action goes through the same check.

Quick Start

npx @authensor/safeclaw

Policy Example: Trusted Enough to Code, Not to Deploy

# safeclaw.config.yaml
rules:
  # Agent can read and write source code
  - action: file.read
    path: "src/**"
    decision: allow

- action: file.write
path: "src/*/.{js,ts}"
decision: allow

# Agent can run tests
- action: shell.execute
command_pattern: "npm test*"
decision: allow

# Agent cannot access secrets
- action: file.read
path: "*/.env"
decision: deny

# Agent cannot push to any branch
- action: shell.execute
command_pattern: "git push*"
decision: deny

# Agent cannot install packages
- action: shell.execute
command_pattern: "npm install*"
decision: deny

# Everything else is denied
- action: "**"
decision: deny

This policy grants the agent a narrow set of permissions — read and write source code, run tests. It cannot deploy, install packages, access secrets, or perform any other action. You are not trusting the agent. You are constraining it.

What "Trust" Actually Means in Practice

When teams say they "trust" an AI agent, they usually mean one of three things:

| What they say | What they mean | The risk |
|---------------|---------------|----------|
| "I trust it to write code" | "It generates useful code most of the time" | Generated code may contain vulnerabilities or hardcoded secrets |
| "I trust it with my repo" | "It has not broken anything yet" | Past behavior does not guarantee future behavior — one bad prompt changes everything |
| "I trust this model provider" | "The company is reputable" | The provider does not control what the model does with your files once it has access |

None of these constitute a security control. They are risk acceptance without risk management.

Building Confidence Without Trust

SafeClaw's simulation mode lets you observe what the agent would do without letting it actually do it:

mode: simulation  # Log all actions but don't block anything

Run your agent in simulation mode for a week. Review the audit trail. You will see every file it tried to read, every command it tried to run, every network request it attempted. Use this data to write your policy. Then switch to enforcement mode.

Why SafeClaw

Related Pages

Try SafeClaw

Action-level gating for AI agents. Set it up in your browser in 60 seconds.

$ npx @authensor/safeclaw