What If My AI Agent Goes Rogue? How to Stay in Control

AI agents do not go "rogue" in the sci-fi sense — they go off-script when they misinterpret instructions, hallucinate actions, or follow prompt injections. The result is the same: deleted files, leaked secrets, broken production systems. SafeClaw by Authensor prevents this by intercepting every action before execution and evaluating it against your deny-by-default policies. The agent cannot execute anything your policy does not explicitly permit, regardless of what it "decides" to do.

What "Going Rogue" Actually Looks Like

Forget the movie scenarios. Here is what a rogue AI agent looks like in practice:

Scenario 1: Misinterpreted instruction
You say: "Clean up the test directory." The agent interprets "clean up" as rm -rf tests/ — deleting your entire test suite, not just temporary test artifacts.

Scenario 2: Hallucinated action
The agent generates a plan to "optimize the database" that includes running DROP TABLE users because it hallucinated that a backup exists.

Scenario 3: Prompt injection
The agent reads a markdown file containing hidden instructions: . The agent follows the injected instruction.

Scenario 4: Goal drift
The agent is debugging a slow API endpoint. It decides the root cause is the database schema and begins rewriting migration files — a task you never asked for.

All four scenarios share the same root cause: the agent had the ability to execute harmful actions because no policy restricted it.

How SafeClaw Keeps You in Control

SafeClaw sits between the agent and your system. Every action — file read, file write, shell command, network request — passes through the policy engine first.

Quick Start

npx @authensor/safeclaw

Policy That Contains Agent Behavior

# safeclaw.config.yaml
rules:
  # Allow reading source and test files
  - action: file.read
    path: "src/**"
    decision: allow

- action: file.read
    path: "tests/**"
    decision: allow

# Allow writing to source files only
  - action: file.write
    path: "src/*/.{js,ts}"
    decision: allow

# Block all file deletions
  - action: file.delete
    path: "**"
    decision: deny
    reason: "Agents cannot delete files"

# Block all shell commands except tests
  - action: shell.execute
    command_pattern: "npm test*"
    decision: allow

- action: shell.execute
    command_pattern: "**"
    decision: deny
    reason: "Shell commands outside test execution are blocked"

# Block all network requests
  - action: network.request
    host: "**"
    decision: deny
    reason: "Outbound network requests are blocked"

With this policy, the agent can read code, write code, and run tests. It cannot delete files, run arbitrary commands, or make network requests. If the agent "goes rogue," it hits a wall on every harmful action.

What Happens When the Agent Tries Something Blocked

The agent receives a clear denial:

{
  "action": "shell.execute",
  "command": "rm -rf tests/",
  "decision": "deny",
  "reason": "Shell commands outside test execution are blocked",
  "timestamp": "2026-02-13T10:23:45Z"
}

The agent can then either:

• Request human approval (if your policy uses human_review decisions)


• Explain what it wanted to do and ask the developer to do it manually


• Try a different approach that fits within its permissions

The Kill Switch

SafeClaw's deny-by-default model means you can shut down all agent actions by setting a single rule:

rules:
  - action: "**"
    decision: deny
    reason: "All agent actions suspended"

This immediately blocks everything. Use it as an emergency stop if you observe unexpected behavior.

Why SafeClaw

• 446 tests ensure the policy engine correctly handles every action type, including edge cases that an agent under prompt injection might exploit
• Deny-by-default means the agent has zero permissions at baseline — rogue behavior hits a deny on every unauthorized action
• Sub-millisecond evaluation means containment is instantaneous
• Hash-chained audit trail lets you forensically reconstruct exactly what the agent attempted, whether it was allowed or denied

Related Pages

• Should I Trust AI Agents with My Codebase?
• What Can AI Agents Do to My Computer?
• Incident Response for AI Agents
• Pattern: Fail-Closed Design